Interview Questions140

    LPACs, Conflicts of Interest, and ILPA Principles

    Who sits on a fund's LPAC, what members owe other LPs, which conflicts they clear, and why their consent is not a finding that a deal is fair.

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    Introduction

    On paper, a limited partner advisory committee (LPAC) resembles a board of directors: a small group that meets, votes, and signs off where the manager's interests and the fund's diverge. Legally, the resemblance ends there. The committee exists only because the limited partnership agreement (LPA) creates it, its members are chosen by the general partner (GP) whose conflicts they review, and under the Institutional Limited Partners Association (ILPA) Model LPA they owe no fiduciary duty to anyone, other limited partners (LPs) included. What private capital advisory bankers do defines the committee, and the limited partnership agreement article covers the clause requiring its consent.

    For a private capital advisory (PCA) banker, the committee is the first audience for any conflicted deal, including every continuation vehicle (CV). Its yes clears a conflict under the contract; it says nothing binding about whether the price was fair.

    Who Sits on an LPAC and What Members Owe

    Seats, Side Letters, and the Largest LPs

    Under ILPA's July 2020 Model LPA, the manager appoints the members, each representing a different LP unaffiliated with the GP, and a member leaves if its LP defaults or transfers its whole commitment. In practice the GP fills seats partly through one-off negotiations with large investors, and the model's most favored nation clause excludes committee seats, so one LP's seat gives others no claim; negotiating fund terms and side letters covers how such terms are traded.

    ILPA's Principles 3.0 push back on a committee of only the biggest commitments. They ask for a representational cross-section by size, investor type, and relationship with the GP, no single institution with a veto, and members without co-investment or secondaries programs, who are less likely to sit on the other side of a decision.

    No Fiduciary Duty, Full Indemnity

    The model is explicit: no member, and no LP it represents, owes fiduciary duties to the fund, the GP, or any LP, and each may weigh only the interests it chooses, including its own institution's. Members are unpaid, insured at the fund's cost, and indemnified by the fund unless a court finds bad faith, and acting for the member's own LP is expressly not bad faith. Delaware's partnership statute adds that serving on a committee does not count as participating in control of the business, so a seat does not risk an LP's limited liability.

    How an LPAC Meeting Should Run

    Under the Model LPA, the GP calls a meeting at least yearly and whenever a matter needs consent, with ten business days' notice and the documents attached. Decisions are written consents of a majority. The committee may request information and appoint its own professional advisers, both at the fund's expense, and may require an independent firm to confirm any valuation. Principles 3.0 add a quorum of half the members, no deemed consent, and a private session before every vote.

    In Camera Session

    The part of an LPAC meeting held without the general partner or its affiliates present, so members can discuss a proposal among themselves or meet the fund's auditor privately. ILPA's Principles 3.0 recommend one at every meeting and before any vote.

    The recommended sequence blocks three shortcuts: consent after the deal closes, a vote before members have read the papers, and a decision with the GP in the room. ILPA also wants any member conflict disclosed first, such as lending to the company or owning part of the manager.

    1

    Written notice

    The GP describes the conflict and circulates the full materials.

    2

    Member conflicts disclosed

    The GP or the member flags any interest in the outcome.

    3

    Questions and advisers

    Members seek more information and, where needed, their own counsel or valuation adviser.

    4

    In camera session

    Members deliberate without the GP before voting.

    5

    Written consent and record

    A majority decides in writing, and the GP keeps the voting record and minutes.

    The Conflicts an LPAC Is Asked to Clear

    Beyond the affiliated-transaction clause, the Principles extend the mandate to valuation, key person matters, extensions, leverage, and expenses. Most requests fall into six categories:

    ConflictWhat the GP asksILPA benchmark
    Cross-fund investmentApprove a fund investing in an earlier fund's companyAn LPA cap on overlaps
    Asset transfers and GP-ledsApprove a sale to another GP-managed vehicleCompetitive valuation; carry rolled in kind
    Affiliated service providersApprove fees to a GP-affiliated firmApproval by an LPAC majority
    Expenses and co-investmentAccept how deal costs are shared with co-investorsPro rata sharing
    ValuationReview a method change or disputed markIndependent confirmation on request
    Key person and termConsider departures or an extensionBoth within the LPAC's mandate

    The first row is the least obvious conflict, because nothing passes between the GP and the fund directly.

    Cross-Fund Investment

    An investment by a manager's current fund in a company already held by one of its earlier funds, typically in a new financing round. Because the GP sets terms on both sides and the new money can support the earlier fund's mark, ILPA recommends an LPA cap on such overlaps and LPAC review.

    The affiliated-fee row is where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has tested what an approval is worth. In an August 2020 order against Rialto Capital Management, it found that the real estate manager's advisory committees approved its in-house third party task costs each year on memos claiming evidence of market rates, though its last market analysis dated from 2012 and a disclosed 11% overhead factor had become 25%. The funds were also charged about $3 million of costs belonging to co-investment vehicles. Rialto repaid them and paid a $350,000 penalty without admitting or denying the findings: every approval existed, but the information behind it did not hold up.

    Members who owe the fund no duty and see what the GP presents cannot certify a price. On a CV, price is protected by a competitive buyer process, independent validation such as a fairness opinion, and each LP's sell-or-roll election; ILPA's May 2023 continuation fund guidance treats LPAC review as one layer among these, as conflicts of interest, fairness opinions, and the ILPA guidance sets out. Nor does consent shield the manager: Rialto was sanctioned under the antifraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act despite holding every approval.

    Members can share the conflict they review: on a GP-led deal one may bid, roll, or negotiate a stapled commitment to the GP's next fund. Principles 3.0 ask GPs to disclose members' participation as buyers, and ILPA's June 2026 draft CV guidance would let the committee appoint its own independent financial advisor at the existing fund's expense.

    Breadth is the other weakness. ILPA says GPs should not pre-clear conflicts through broad disclosures, and that a committee's silence should never count as consent. SEC examiners reported three failures in a January 2022 risk alert:

    • Conflicts never brought to the committee.
    • Consent obtained late, after the transaction.
    • Approval on incomplete information.

    In a Delaware Court of Chancery complaint filed in late November 2025 (public version dated December 3, summarized in a Davis Polk client update), the Abu Dhabi Investment Council, an LP and advisory board member in funds run by the Energy & Minerals Group (EMG), sought to halt the sale of the funds' stake in Ascent Resources to an EMG continuation vehicle. It alleged five business days' notice of a joint advisory board vote, materials arriving until the day before, refused requests for an in camera session, and, after the October 30, 2025 meeting yielded three approvals from 43 members, consents sought one member at a time.

    Those were allegations, not findings. The dispute went to arbitration under the LPAs, a March 2026 ruling cleared the way, and EMG announced on March 25, 2026 that it had closed a $1.5 billion continuation vehicle advised by Evercore. The fight was over how consent was sought, which makes the committee's paper trail part of the advisor's product: notice, materials, member conflicts, the in camera session, and the written consent are what an arbitrator, a regulator, or the next fund's LPs examine long after the price is settled.

    Interview Questions

    1
    Question #1Easy

    What is an LPAC, and what is it asked to approve?

    The limited partner advisory committee (LPAC) is a small group of the fund's larger LPs, set up under the LPA, that the GP consults on governance matters. It is not a board and does not approve investments.

    It is typically asked to:

    • •Approve conflicts of interest, such as deals between funds managed by the same GP, fee arrangements with affiliates and, most importantly for PCA, continuation vehicles in which the GP sits on both sides.
    • •Review valuations or the valuation policy in some funds.
    • •Consent to waivers of LPA terms, such as concentration limits or extensions of the investment period or fund term.

    An LPAC consent usually waives a conflict rather than endorsing the deal on its merits, which is why good practice gives members full information, enough time and access to independent advice.

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