WeWork's $47 Billion IPO Collapse in Six Weeks

On August 14, 2019, WeWork parent The We Company filed an S-1 to take itself public at an implied valuation of roughly $47 billion, the most recent private-market mark from a January 2019 SoftBank round. Six weeks later, on September 30, 2019, the company formally withdrew the S-1. In between, the marketed valuation collapsed from $47 billion to below $10 billion, founder Adam Neumann was removed as CEO, and the institutional buyer base publicly refused to absorb the deal at any price close to the private mark. SoftBank stepped in on October 23, 2019 with a $9.5 billion rescue that valued the company at under $8 billion, an 83% discount to the prior mark, and took roughly 80% of the equity.

The interesting question is not why the IPO failed. The S-1 contains most of the answers. It is how a real-estate company priced for several years as a technology platform reached the IPO door at $47 billion, what the public-market discipline revealed that the private-market funding had failed to, and why the rejection became the doctrinal reference point for every subsequent unicorn-stage listing. This study reconstructs the deal from the S-1 itself, the SoftBank disclosures, the press coverage that argued the deal apart in real time, and the eventual SPAC merger, Chapter 11 filing, and 2024 emergence under new ownership.

Almost every feature of the failed IPO traces back to a single positioning decision: WeWork's framing of itself as a technology platform when its underlying economics were classic commercial real-estate sublease arbitrage.

The WeWork concept

Founded in 2010 by Adam Neumann and Miguel McKelvey in New York, WeWork's core business model was straightforward. The company signed long-term leases on commercial office space (typically 10-15 years), built out the space with a distinctive aesthetic (exposed brick, communal long tables, glass-walled private offices, free coffee and beer), and sublet the space to companies and individuals on much shorter-term contracts (month-to-month for individuals, one-to-three-year terms for enterprise members). The arbitrage was a function of three things: the gross-margin spread between long-term wholesale lease rates and short-term member fees, the amenity premium WeWork could charge for community and design, and operating leverage as occupancy stabilized in each location.

The growth was real and rapid. WeWork ran roughly 845 locations across 122 cities by Q1 2019 per the S-1. Revenue grew from approximately $436 million in 2016 to $886 million in 2017 to $1.82 billion in 2018. The capital intensity was also real: each new location required millions of dollars of buildout capex against several years of below-occupancy revenue before stabilizing. The model worked at the level of individual mature locations; whether it worked at corporate-portfolio scale was the question the IPO was supposed to test.

The "tech company" framing and the multiple gap

Neumann's positioning of WeWork as a technology platform was the central marketing choice of the funding cycle. The S-1 used the word "technology" more than 100 times. The prospectus argued network effects (more members produce more data produce better matching produce more members), platform optionality (WeLive, WeGrow, the Rise by We gym, the WeWork Labs accelerator), and a "physical social network" of members whose value scaled super-linearly with the network's size. The implied multiple at a $47 billion valuation against $1.82 billion in revenue (~26x) was firmly in technology-multiple territory rather than real-estate multiple territory.

The doctrinal counter-argument was straightforward. A real-estate company's defining feature is duration mismatch between assets (long-term leases) and liabilities (short-term membership revenue), and the resulting sensitivity to occupancy and economic cycles. WeWork had both characteristics in full. Its operating leverage was the operating leverage of a real-estate portfolio. Its competitive moat, to the extent one existed, was brand and aesthetic, not technology. The platform features (WeLive, WeGrow) had not scaled. The technology layer (the member app, the location-data analytics) was not a meaningful revenue driver.

The path from WeWork's 2010 founding to its $47 billion pre-IPO valuation runs through one investor and one investment vehicle: Masayoshi Son and the SoftBank Vision Fund.

Son meets Neumann

The defining moment of WeWork's funding history came in 2017. Masayoshi Son visited WeWork's New York headquarters for approximately thirty minutes, per CNBC's investigation of the relationship, and committed $4.4 billion to the company through the Vision Fund. The round priced WeWork at roughly $20 billion, more than triple its prior valuation. Son reportedly told Neumann that "in a fight, who wins, the smart guy or the crazy guy?" and answered his own question: "Crazy is better." Subsequent SoftBank rounds added approximately $10 billion of further equity and debt, and the January 2019 round priced WeWork at $47 billion. SoftBank's cumulative commitment to WeWork reached roughly $16 billion by the time of the 2023 Chapter 11 filing.

The defining feature of the SoftBank funding pattern was its price-anchoring power. Each successive round priced above the previous mark, and SoftBank itself was often the largest participant in those rounds. Outside investors who participated alongside SoftBank were effectively ratifying a mark that SoftBank had economic incentive to support. There was no third-party valuation mechanism, because every meaningful round was led by the same investor whose accounting marks depended on the round happening.

Why SoftBank's incentives diverged from outside investors'

The asymmetry mattered. A traditional venture-capital fund holds dozens of positions and is genuinely indifferent to any single mark; a sovereign-anchored mega-fund like the Vision Fund concentrates positions and has an institutional incentive to support its marquee marks. SoftBank's Saudi PIF-anchored capital base added another layer: outside Vision Fund LPs evaluated SoftBank partly on the headline marks of its largest portfolio positions, which made WeWork's price-supporting effect cyclical. By 2019, the $47 billion mark functioned as a self-referential anchor: SoftBank's portfolio value depended on it, SoftBank's reputation depended on it, and SoftBank's ability to raise Vision Fund 2 depended in part on demonstrating that Vision Fund 1's marks were real.

Son's eventual admission, made on the May 2020 earnings call after the IPO failure and the bailout, was unusual in its directness. The point for the case study is that the $47 billion valuation was always a private-market construction sustained by one investor's accounting need rather than a market-tested price; the IPO was always going to test whether public markets agreed.

The August 14, 2019 prospectus filing was the moment private-market opacity ended. Once the disclosures were in the public record, the deal had roughly six weeks to defend a valuation framework that, on its own published numbers, did not survive scrutiny.

The financials, in their plain form

WeWork reported $1.82 billion in 2018 revenue against a $1.93 billion net loss, per the S-1 filing. Losses were growing roughly in line with revenue. There was no clear pathway to profitability in any near-term scenario consistent with the company's continued global expansion. The capital intensity of each new location, the duration mismatch between leases and member contracts, and the long-term lease commitments accumulating on the balance sheet were all visible on the page. Future undiscounted minimum lease payment obligations reached $47.2 billion as of June 30, 2019, against a balance-sheet lease liability of roughly $18 billion under the new ASC 842 accounting standard.

What the financials made plain was that WeWork's growth at the rate it had been growing required perpetual external capital. Without continuous new equity and debt rounds, the company's existing locations would eventually stabilize and the lease-versus-membership math would matter on a unit-economic basis. Whether that math worked at maturity was a genuine question the company had never had to answer publicly, because every prior round had funded the next stage of growth rather than the maturation of existing locations.

"Community-adjusted EBITDA," the metric that broke the credibility

The single most damaging element of the prospectus was a non-GAAP financial metric the company called "community-adjusted EBITDA." The metric subtracted from net income not just interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (a standard non-GAAP construction), but also rent, marketing expense, general and administrative costs, and even development and design costs. The result was a positive number where standard accounting produced losses. The metric became the focus of every press analysis of the deal within forty-eight hours of the S-1 publication.

Community-adjusted EBITDA

The non-GAAP metric WeWork introduced in its 2018-2019 disclosures, defined as net income before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization, plus stock-based compensation, plus growth and new market development expenses, plus pre-opening location expenses, plus rent, plus marketing expense, plus general and administrative expense, plus several smaller items. By stripping out actual operating costs (most consequentially rent), the metric flattered the underlying economics and presented the location-level business as profitable in a way that the audited financials did not support. It became the single most-mocked element of the prospectus.

The fault was not the use of a non-GAAP metric (most issuers use them) or even the construction of a location-level segment-contribution metric (which would have been defensible). The fault was the framing of a metric that excluded fundamental operating costs as something approximating EBITDA, a term that has accepted accounting meaning. The metric signaled to the institutional investor base that the issuer was unwilling to be measured by conventional standards, and once that signal was sent, the rest of the prospectus was read through the same lens.

The voting structure

The third major S-1 disclosure was governance. WeWork's pre-IPO capital structure included three classes of common stock. Class A (the public float to be sold in the IPO) had one vote per share. Class B and Class C high-vote stock had 20 votes per share. Adam Neumann personally held a majority of the high-vote stock and would therefore retain voting control of the company after the IPO. Provisions further allowed Neumann's wife Rebekah, then Chief Brand Officer, to be involved in selecting his successor if he died or was incapacitated. The supervoting structure would only convert to one-share-one-vote on Neumann's death, disability, or if his holdings fell below 5% of outstanding shares.

Three-class founder-control structures were not unique to WeWork: Facebook, Snap, Alphabet, Lyft, and several others had used multi-class structures in their listings. The WeWork construction exceeded peer norms on two dimensions. The 20-vote multiple was higher than the typical 10-vote peer construction. The successor-selection provision involving the founder's spouse was structurally unusual. After the institutional investor pushback intensified through early September, the prospectus was amended to reduce the supervoting ratio from 20 to 10 and to remove the spouse-successor provision. The amendments came too late to settle the institutional perception.

The institutional investor revolt against WeWork's IPO ran in parallel with a press cycle that built a clear public narrative around four self-dealing or governance themes. The S-1 disclosed each of them; the press amplified all four; the combination made any later concessions look reactive rather than principled.

Neumann's $700 million pre-IPO cash withdrawal

The Wall Street Journal reported in July 2019 that Adam Neumann had cashed out at least $700 million from his WeWork holdings ahead of the planned IPO, through a combination of direct share sales (approximately $300 million) and loans secured against his WeWork shares (approximately $400 million). A founder cashing out roughly $700 million from a still-pre-IPO position is unusual on its own; the size relative to typical founder pre-IPO liquidity was striking. The implicit signal to institutional investors was that the founder was extracting cash from the position at scale before retail and institutional buyers were given the chance to take on the same exposure.

The "We" trademark transaction

In July 2019, during the corporate restructuring that renamed WeWork as The We Company, Neumann personally controlled an LLC (We Holdings LLC) that held trademark rights to the word "We." The newly formed parent company acquired those trademark rights for approximately $5.9 million worth of partnership interests, a payment to Neumann's controlled entity. The transaction was disclosed in the August 14 S-1 and became the single most-quoted example of self-dealing in the deal coverage. Within three weeks Neumann returned the $5.9 million in partnership interests to the company, but the optics of the transaction were already set.

Real-estate self-dealing

WeWork's prospectus disclosed that Adam Neumann personally owned or partially owned several commercial buildings that WeWork leased. The future-rent commitment from WeWork to entities partially controlled by Neumann ran into the hundreds of millions of dollars over the term of those leases. The arrangement created a classic related-party conflict: a founder negotiating long-term lease commitments from the company to himself as landlord, with the company bearing the credit risk on the lease. The SEC opened an investigation; the New York Attorney General opened a separate inquiry. Neither investigation produced a formal action, but both signaled that the structure was regulatorily problematic.

The persona

The press narrative had a fourth element that was less about the prospectus and more about the founder. Press reporting (Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Vanity Fair) detailed Neumann's lifestyle: a private jet, a substantial real-estate portfolio, alleged recreational drug use on company aircraft, and frequent comparisons of WeWork's mission to broader spiritual or civilizational projects. The persona was inseparable from WeWork's branding through 2018-2019; once the IPO opened the company to institutional-investor scrutiny, that same persona became a reputational liability. Institutional underwriters, who themselves face fiduciary and reputational constraints, found the persona difficult to defend to their own committees and their own end investors.

The combined effect of the four themes was that by mid-September the deal was being discussed in the financial press not as a complex IPO pricing problem but as a governance failure with a price tag attached.

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The collapse moved fast. Mid-August through end-September. The pace itself is part of the case study.

August 14 to September 4: the early reaction

The S-1 publication on August 14 triggered immediate financial-press scrutiny. The Atlantic, the Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg, and Financial Times all ran extended governance and economics analyses within the first week. By the third week of August the marketed valuation range had begun to slip publicly from $47 billion toward $20-25 billion. Underwriters JPMorgan (the lead) and Goldman Sachs were reportedly pressuring the company to amend the governance structure before the formal roadshow. The August 14 to September 4 window was the period during which the deal could still have been salvaged at a meaningfully lower valuation; the company chose to defend the original framing rather than reprice early.

September 4 to September 17: the governance climb-down

The first concrete concession came on September 4: Neumann returned the $5.9 million "We" trademark payment. The next two weeks saw a series of additional governance amendments: the supervoting ratio reduced from 20 to 10 votes per share; the spouse-successor provision removed; the marketed valuation range publicly cut toward the $10-15 billion band. Each concession came in response to specific investor complaints reported in the press the day or two before; the pattern made the company look reactive and lacking a defensible original framework. By September 17 the institutional roadshow that had been scheduled to start was indefinitely postponed.

September 17 to September 30: the withdrawal

The endgame was compressed. September 17: WeWork announces the IPO is postponed. September 22-23: the SoftBank board and outside directors push Neumann to step aside. September 24: Adam Neumann resigns as CEO; Artie Minson and Sebastian Gunningham named co-CEOs. September 30: the company formally submits the S-1 withdrawal request to the SEC. The IPO had failed, the founder had been removed, and the company faced an immediate liquidity question because the planned IPO proceeds were no longer coming.

Without an IPO, WeWork faced an immediate liquidity crisis. The company's cash burn was unsustainable at the pace of new-location buildouts already committed, and the lease portfolio carried fixed obligations that did not flex with revenue. SoftBank, with the largest existing exposure and the strongest accounting-mark incentive to prevent a Chapter 11, became the only credible rescuer.

The rescue structure

On October 22-23, 2019, SoftBank announced a $9.5 billion rescue package valued at less than $8 billion post-money, an 83% discount to the January 2019 mark. The structure had three pieces. SoftBank launched a $3 billion tender offer for existing shareholders. It committed $5 billion of new debt financing. It accelerated approximately $1.5 billion of previously committed funding. The combined effect lifted SoftBank's ownership to approximately 80% of WeWork. SoftBank effectively bought 80% of the company a second time at one-eighth of the price it had paid for its earlier rounds.

The structural irony was complete. SoftBank's price-anchoring incentive through 2017-2019 had produced the $47 billion mark; the IPO had publicly disproven the mark; SoftBank's accounting need to keep the company alive had then forced it to provide rescue capital at the corrected valuation. The mark-supporting cycle had become a mark-collapsing one, and SoftBank's exposure had multiplied.

Adam Neumann's exit package

The most controversial element of the rescue was Neumann's negotiated exit. SoftBank's offer to purchase Neumann's existing shares was capped at approximately $975 million. He received a $500 million personal loan facility to refinance his existing margin loans against WeWork stock (which had collapsed in collateral value). He was paid a $185 million consulting fee. The total potential package, reported in CNBC and Fortune coverage, reached approximately $1.7 billion for Neumann at the moment SoftBank was injecting $9.5 billion to keep the company alive.

The package became the single most-cited example of founder wealth extraction in the post-2010s tech-IPO era. WeWork employees, who were watching their stock options decline by 80% and facing layoffs, publicly objected. SoftBank defended the package as the price of cooperative cooperation and Neumann's agreement not to sue or contest the takeover. The accounting case for the package was clear from SoftBank's perspective: avoiding a multi-year legal contest with the founder of an asset SoftBank was already carrying at $16 billion of investment was worth a one-time $1.7 billion payment.

The years from late 2019 through 2024 reshaped WeWork from the unicorn that had captured the financial imagination of the late 2010s into a much smaller, much less valuable, much more conventional company. Three distinct phases run through the period.

Sandeep Mathrani and the operational reset

In February 2020, SoftBank named Sandeep Mathrani, the former CEO of mall REIT GGP, as WeWork's new CEO. Mathrani was an experienced commercial real-estate operator with no technology background, and his appointment signaled SoftBank's recognition that WeWork needed to be run as a real-estate company. Mathrani's early actions were familiar: lease portfolio rationalization, exit of non-core geographies, headcount reductions, cost cuts at every level of the organization.

The COVID-19 pandemic from March 2020 onward simultaneously gutted near-term demand for co-working space and accelerated the transition Mathrani was already executing. Office-vacancy economics in major cities collapsed; many WeWork members exited their contracts; the company's existing lease obligations remained fixed against the falling membership revenue. The crisis was bad enough to justify aggressive restructuring; the restructuring was the right response either way. By 2021 Mathrani had brought the company to a level of operational stability that finally made a public listing possible.

The operational reset had real and visible effects. WeWork closed or exited approximately 150 underperforming locations between early 2020 and mid-2021. Headquarters headcount fell substantially. The remaining lease portfolio was renegotiated where landlords had economic incentive to accept lower rents in a weak office market. WeWork's location-level contribution margin, on a more conventional definition than the 2019 community-adjusted EBITDA construct, turned positive at the portfolio level by late 2021. None of this changed the structural reality that the pre-pandemic lease commitments still ran for ten to fifteen years and the post-pandemic membership demand was permanently lower than the original underwriting assumed.

The 2021 SPAC merger with BowX

On March 26, 2021, WeWork agreed to merge with BowX Acquisition Corp., a special-purpose acquisition company, at an enterprise value of approximately $9 billion. The transaction closed on October 21, 2021. Total cash raised by WeWork through the transaction was approximately $1.3 billion, including BowX's $483 million of SPAC cash and an $800 million PIPE led by Insight Partners, Starwood Capital Group, Fidelity, and BlackRock. Marcelo Claure continued as Executive Chairman; Mathrani continued as CEO.

The SPAC path was deliberately the lower-scrutiny route to public markets. A traditional 2021 IPO would have required a fresh prospectus, the same kind of public S-1 scrutiny that had killed the 2019 attempt, and a roadshow defending the new valuation. The SPAC structure allowed WeWork to negotiate terms with one counterparty (BowX), provide forward-looking projections that would have been impermissible in a traditional IPO prospectus, and close into the public market without the same institutional gauntlet. The mechanism worked: WeWork shares opened at approximately $11.78 and rose roughly 13% on the first trading day.

SPAC (special-purpose acquisition company)

A shell company that raises capital through its own IPO with the sole purpose of using that capital to acquire a target private company within a specified time window (typically two years). The resulting reverse merger takes the private target public without a traditional S-1 process, and crucially allows the target to publish forward-looking financial projections that traditional IPO prospectus rules prohibit. SPACs were the dominant 2020-2021 alternative listing mechanism for companies that wanted to access public markets without traditional-IPO scrutiny.

The $9 billion SPAC valuation represented a roughly 80% discount to the 2019 private mark and was, in retrospect, still optimistic relative to what the underlying business could ultimately support.

Go deeper before an interview: our 160-page PDF covers IPO mechanics, SPAC reverse mergers, governance signals, and full behavioral prep, access the IB Interview Guide and pair it with these case studies.

Chapter 11 and the Yardi takeover

The post-SPAC trajectory was downward. WeWork's stock declined steadily through 2022 and into 2023 as commercial real-estate fundamentals deteriorated, post-COVID return-to-office patterns proved weaker than the bull case assumed, and the company's underlying lease obligations remained the binding constraint. By mid-2023 the equity was trading below $1 per share. On November 6, 2023, WeWork Inc. and several hundred US and Canadian affiliates filed voluntary Chapter 11 petitions in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. The filing disclosed approximately $18.65 billion in total debts against $15.06 billion in assets, with $25.1 billion of undiscounted long-term lease obligations.

The bankruptcy ran for seven months. WeWork negotiated lease rejections across more than 30% of its active portfolio, secured a reduction of more than 50% in future rent commitments (approximately $12 billion of total relief by emergence), and obtained a Restructuring Support Agreement from holders of approximately 92% of its secured notes. On June 11, 2024, WeWork emerged from Chapter 11 with a fundamentally new ownership structure: property-management software company Yardi Systems, founded and led by Anant Yardi, took a 60% equity stake; a group of hedge funds (including Cupar Grimmond) took 20%; SoftBank retained 20%. Approximately $4 billion of pre-petition debt was eliminated; $400 million of new equity capital was injected; John Santora was named CEO.

The end-state was that a Santa Barbara, California property-management software company had become the majority owner of what was once the most valuable private real-estate-and-technology company in the world. The valuation had compressed from $47 billion in January 2019 to a residual equity value measured in hundreds of millions of dollars by mid-2024.

The deal is the doctrinal reference point for the unicorn-to-IPO transition, and its lessons cluster around three themes.

Public-market discipline reasserted

The single most important effect of the WeWork rejection was the reassertion of public-market scrutiny as a meaningful constraint on private-market valuation inflation. Through 2017-2019 the Vision Fund and several other late-stage capital allocators had effectively decoupled private-market marks from any public-market reference. WeWork was the first major test, and the rejection was decisive. Subsequent unicorn-stage companies that went public in 2020-2022 (Airbnb, DoorDash, Snowflake, Coinbase, Roblox) priced more conservatively relative to their last private marks, governed more conventionally, and structured supervoting more carefully than they would have without the WeWork precedent. The IPO discipline of the early 2020s, even allowing for the COVID-era SPAC boom, was meaningfully tighter than it would have been if WeWork had cleared at $47 billion.

The doctrine applies in both directions. The IPO process is not just an issuer's path to public markets; it is the public market's mechanism for testing whether private-market marks reflect underlying economics. When the public market refuses, the private mark is wrong, regardless of how many rounds priced the asset higher. The mechanics of reading SEC filings (S-1, 10-K, related-party transactions) are covered for candidates in our SEC filings primer and the full IPO process is covered in our IPO process explainer.

The Vision Fund losses and the price-anchoring problem

SoftBank's cumulative WeWork loss reached roughly $16 billion by 2023, the single largest documented venture-and-growth-capital loss on one position in the modern era. The Vision Fund's broader portfolio absorbed parallel writedowns through 2022-2023 across Uber, Didi, OYO, Wag, and others. Masayoshi Son's investing approach was publicly recalibrated. Vision Fund 2 deployment slowed materially after 2022.

The structural lesson is that price-anchoring funding cycles, in which one investor's accounting mark dominates the valuation of a position, are unstable at the IPO door. The mark survives only as long as the next round of capital ratifies it. The first round that fails to ratify (in WeWork's case, the public-market IPO) collapses the entire prior cycle at once.

The verdict the record supports

Two things are now settled. The $47 billion private mark was not supportable by any public-market valuation framework available in 2019; the gap between the private mark and the marketed range was a function of the price-anchoring dynamic, not a temporary mispricing. The IPO's structural design (governance, metric framing, founder cashout) made the deal unmarketable at any price close to the private mark, and the institutional rejection was correct on the disclosed facts.

What is not settled is the counterfactual: whether a more conventionally governed WeWork at a $10-15 billion IPO valuation in 2019, with a clean three-class structure capped at 10 votes per share, a normal location-level contribution metric instead of community-adjusted EBITDA, and no founder cashout, could have been a successful public company. Mathrani's 2020-2021 operational reset suggests it was at least possible; the eventual 2023 Chapter 11 suggests the underlying lease-economics problem was structural and would have surfaced regardless. Where sources disagree, the disagreement is real and not resolved by Claude's own judgment.

For the candidate or analyst working through the deal, the case is best understood as the failed IPO that taught a generation of unicorn-stage companies to be public-market issuers rather than infinite private-funding recipients. The lesson sits between two industry tracks (TMT and ECM); the broader framing is in our equity capital markets guide and our common valuation multiples primer for the multiple-versus-framing question that the deal turned on.

1. 1The We Company, Form S-1 filing, SEC EDGAR (August 14, 2019).
2. 2CNBC, "WeWork pulls IPO filing" (September 30, 2019).
3. 3Bloomberg, "SoftBank Unveils $9.5 Billion WeWork Rescue, Gets 80% Stake" (October 23, 2019).
4. 4CNN Business, "WeWork bailout: SoftBank will own most of the company as Adam Neumann gets big payout" (October 22, 2019).
5. 5CNBC, "Masayoshi Son's unyielding optimism led SoftBank to overvalue WeWork, sources say" (September 25, 2019).
6. 6CNBC, "WeWork CEO returns $5.9 million the company paid for 'We' trademark" (September 4, 2019).
7. 7Wall Street Journal (via The Real Deal), "Adam Neumann has cashed out more than $700M prior to We Company IPO" (July 18, 2019).
8. 8Fortune, "WeWork agrees to $9 billion SPAC deal in new path to go public" (March 26, 2021).
9. 9CNBC, "WeWork, once valued at $47 billion, files for bankruptcy" (November 7, 2023).
10. 10Business Wire, "WeWork Announces Emergence from Chapter 11 and New Leadership Appointments" (June 11, 2024).
11. 11Reuters (via Yahoo Finance), "TIMELINE-How SoftBank's bets on WeWork totaled $16 bln".
12. 12Wolf Street, "How Can a Company with $1.8 Billion in Revenue Lose $1.9 Billion? WeWork Shows How" (March 25, 2019).
13. 13PitchBook, "Adam Neumann gives $5.9M trademark payment back to WeWork".
14. 14Fast Company, "WeWork CEO's side hustle is being WeWork's landlord".
15. 15Mayer Brown, "WeWork Files Chapter 11: Issues for Landlords".