Hertz's $19 Billion Chapter 11 That Made Equity Whole

On May 22, 2020, Hertz Global Holdings and a group of US and Canadian subsidiaries filed voluntary petitions for Chapter 11 reorganization in the District of Delaware. The company had approximately $19 billion of total funded debt and roughly $1 billion of cash remaining; pandemic-driven travel collapse had wiped out roughly 80% of revenue in eight weeks; 20,000 employees had been laid off or furloughed in the weeks before the filing. It was the largest pandemic-era US corporate bankruptcy of the first wave and one of the largest US bankruptcies of any kind that decade.

Thirteen months later, on June 30, 2021, Hertz emerged from Chapter 11 in a position that conventional bankruptcy doctrine would not have predicted: every dollar of pre-petition debt was paid in full, every creditor class voted yes, and pre-petition equity holders walked away with over $1 billion of value (a 3% stake in the reorganized company, 30-year warrants for an additional 18%, and the ability to participate in a $1.635 billion rights offering). Judge Mary Walrath, who confirmed the plan, called the outcome "a fantastic result that surpasses any result that I've seen in any chapter 11 case that I've faced in my 20-plus years." This study reconstructs how, between the filing and the exit, a fleet-financed bankruptcy was transformed by a meme-stock rally, an SEC intervention, a bidding war between two top-tier sponsor consortia, and an unusual macro tailwind in used-car prices into one of the rarest restructuring outcomes in modern US Chapter 11 history.

The Chapter 11 looked, in May 2020, like a straightforward pandemic casualty. The underlying mechanics were more specific. Hertz did not file because operating cash flow had failed; it filed because the financing structure that funded its rental fleet had no mechanism for absorbing a sudden collapse in vehicle utilization.

The COVID shock

US air-travel volumes dropped by roughly 96% in April 2020 versus the prior year, per TSA passenger-screening data. Rental-car demand follows air travel almost mechanically. Hertz's revenue fell roughly 80% through March and April 2020. The company laid off or furloughed approximately 20,000 employees by mid-May. Cash reserves of approximately $1 billion were burning at a pace that gave the company weeks, not months, before insolvency. The shock was real and the operating-business response was as fast as it could practically be.

The shape of Hertz's debt stack made the operating shock immediately financial. Hertz carried approximately $19 billion of total funded debt, but the more important number was the composition. Most of that debt was tied to fleet-financing structures with monthly amortization payments calibrated against the depreciated book value of the underlying vehicles. When demand collapsed and Hertz could neither rent the cars nor sell them at expected residual values, the financing structure went into default mechanically, regardless of the company's intent.

The fleet ABS structure and why it forced the filing

Hertz's worldwide rental fleet (approximately 560,000 vehicles globally, of which roughly 382,000 were in the US) was financed primarily through a set of asset-backed securitization (ABS) facilities. Each ABS facility held a pool of vehicles as collateral, was rated by the rating agencies based on assumed residual values, and required monthly amortization payments tied to the depreciation schedule of the underlying fleet. Hertz did not own its rental fleet in the conventional sense; the ABS noteholders did, via a special-purpose entity, with Hertz holding a residual equity claim in each pool.

On April 27, 2020, Hertz missed an ABS lease payment. The miss triggered cross-default provisions across the ABS structures and required Hertz either to negotiate forbearance with hundreds of ABS noteholders within weeks, or to file. The decision to file was driven less by overall corporate insolvency than by the specific impossibility of restructuring the ABS contracts outside Chapter 11 on the available timeline. The Chapter 11 was a financing-structure decision before it was a corporate-distress decision.

Rental-car asset-backed securitization (ABS)

A financing structure in which a rental-car company places its fleet into a series of special-purpose entities (typically each holding a defined vehicle pool) that issue debt to capital-markets investors. The debt is secured by the fleet itself, with monthly amortization payments tied to the depreciation schedule of the underlying vehicles. Residual-value assumptions (what the vehicle will fetch at fleet-disposal) drive the structure's rating, and a sustained collapse in residual values is the structure's binding stress scenario. Hertz, Avis, and Enterprise all use similar ABS structures.

The structure had no precedent for a 2020-style demand shock combined with a residual-value collapse. The ABS noteholders had ratings-agency expectations and contractual rights, not balance-sheet flexibility. Once the April 27 payment was missed, the path to Chapter 11 was essentially deterministic.

The next month became one of the strangest interludes in modern US securities regulation. While Hertz's corporate restructuring proceeded normally, the company's pre-petition equity behaved in ways that had no precedent in large-cap Chapter 11 history.

Hertz becomes the first meme stock

Pre-petition Hertz common stock (ticker HTZ, later HTZGQ) traded at approximately $0.56 on May 26, 2020, the first trading session after the Chapter 11 filing. Conventional doctrine suggested this price was already generous: in a typical large-cap Chapter 11 with a multi-billion-dollar debt stack ahead of the equity, the residual common stock trades toward zero almost immediately. Instead, retail investors using the Robinhood platform began buying aggressively. By June 8, 2020 the stock had traded as high as $5.53, a nearly 900% move in two weeks. Robinhood-platform accounts holding HTZ grew from approximately 43,000 pre-filing to 171,000 by mid-June.

The rally had no fundamental basis. Hertz's own disclosures throughout the period repeatedly warned that the equity was likely to be worthless. Bankruptcy lawyers and restructuring analysts publicly explained that pre-petition equity in a $19-billion-debt Chapter 11 typically receives zero or near-zero. The rally proceeded anyway. Hertz became the first canonical example of a "meme stock," a security whose price was driven by retail-investor coordination on social media platforms rather than by fundamental claim analysis.

The $1 billion equity offering and the SEC's intervention

On June 11, 2020 Hertz's board, recognizing the unexpected equity rally as a potential source of fresh capital for the estate, sought bankruptcy-court approval to sell up to 246 million newly authorized but unissued shares for up to $1 billion of additional financing. The June 12 court approval came with the explicit acknowledgment that the offering prospectus would disclose that the shares might prove worthless to purchasers. The proposal was procedurally legitimate: a debtor-in-possession can raise capital through any means the bankruptcy court approves, and the proceeds would have supported the estate's value for the benefit of creditors.

The SEC intervened within forty-eight hours. SEC Chair Jay Clayton publicly expressed concern about retail investors purchasing securities of a Chapter 11 debtor at prices the issuer itself had warned could be worthless. The implicit threat was that the SEC could halt the offering by withholding the necessary registration effectiveness. Hertz withdrew the offering after raising approximately $29 million of the planned $500 million-plus first tranche. The episode set the modern precedent for SEC intervention in bankruptcy-period equity issuances.

The legal and policy debate after the SEC intervention was real. Some commentators argued the intervention was paternalistic and that retail investors who chose the exposure should be free to bear the loss. The doctrinal majority view was that selling securities at prices the issuer believed near-zero, with full disclosure of that belief, conflicted with the broader investor-protection mandate of the securities laws. The precedent has held: subsequent meme-stock-era bankruptcy debtors (Revlon in 2022, Bed Bath & Beyond in 2023) faced similar restrictions on equity issuance during their cases.

The Hertz case produced one of the most documented mistimed exits in modern shareholder history, and the vignette is worth including because it shows just how counterintuitive the eventual restructuring outcome turned out to be.

The $1.88 billion to $40 million loss

Carl Icahn had accumulated a position of approximately 39% of Hertz over the years from 2014 to 2020, at a total cost of roughly $1.88 billion. Icahn was one of the most experienced value investors in the modern US market and had served as a board observer on the company through much of his ownership. When Hertz filed for Chapter 11, Icahn concluded that the equity was likely to be wiped out and sold his entire 55+ million share position over several trading days in late May 2020, at an average price of approximately $0.72 per share, for total proceeds of approximately $40 million. The realized loss was approximately $1.84 billion.

Within weeks of Icahn's exit, the meme-stock rally drove the same equity above $5. The eventual restructuring then made the equity worth multiples of even the meme-rally peak. Icahn's exit captured the worst possible timing on the position: he sold before the retail rally, before the bidding war that delivered equity recovery, and before the macro tailwind that made the recovery economics work. By any reading of bankruptcy doctrine in May 2020, his decision was correct. By the actual outcome, it was the largest single-investor loss of timing in a Chapter 11 of the modern era.

The vignette matters because it illustrates how genuinely unusual the Hertz outcome was. A sophisticated doctrinal investor concluded the equity was worthless and exited at near-zero. Retail meme traders pushed the same equity to a brief peak. The eventual restructuring made the equity worth more than even the retail traders had assumed. The three outcomes happened in the same security in the same year.

The Hertz Chapter 11 ran for thirteen months, and the most important developments came not in the operational restructuring but in the sponsor competition for the right to fund the exit. Two PE consortia bid for the restructuring sponsorship, and the bidding dynamic delivered the equity-recovery outcome that defined the case.

The CWD plan

Through late 2020 and early 2021 Hertz's board worked with the "CWD Group" consortium: Centerbridge Partners, Warburg Pincus, Dundon Capital Partners, and an ad hoc group of the company's unsecured noteholders. The CWD plan would have paid creditors in full and provided modest equity recovery (warrants and a small equity allocation to existing shareholders) but at materially less value than what the eventual winning bid delivered. On April 21, 2021 the Bankruptcy Court authorized Hertz to solicit votes on the CWD plan and approved the consortium as the formal Plan sponsors.

The CWD plan was a legitimate exit. It would have closed the case successfully and delivered value to creditors. The existence of an alternative bidder is what changed the math.

The Knighthead/Certares/Apollo counter

A second consortium emerged formally in March 2021: Knighthead Capital Management (a special-situations hedge fund led by Tom Wagner and Ara Cohen), Certares Opportunities (a travel-focused private investment firm led by Greg O'Hara), and Apollo Capital Management. The consortium's distinguishing positioning was a willingness to pay more, and specifically to direct more of the additional value to pre-petition equity holders. The strategic logic was that the equity-recovery feature would attract pre-petition shareholder support, simplifying the plan's confirmation path and giving the consortium a defensible thesis on the post-restructuring company's franchise value.

The two consortia traded a series of revised bids through April and into May 2021. The auction process the bankruptcy court approved was structured to test which proposal delivered the highest and best value across all stakeholder classes. On May 13, 2021 the Knighthead/Certares/Apollo group's revised proposal was determined to be the superior offer; Hertz formally selected the consortium as the new plan sponsors. The bidding war had produced an outcome that the original CWD plan would not have.

The two-plan structure became the defining feature of the case. Without the Knighthead/Certares/Apollo competition, the existing equity holders would have received the CWD plan's substantially lower recovery. The bidding war was the proximate mechanism that delivered the unusual outcome.

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The structure of the winning plan deserves close attention because every major feature was engineered with a specific stakeholder class in mind.

The structure

The Knighthead/Certares/Apollo plan committed approximately $2.9 billion of direct common-equity investment, $1.5 billion of preferred stock (provided by Apollo), and a fully backstopped $1.635 billion rights offering open to existing Hertz shareholders. Total fresh capital was roughly $6 billion. The plan's debtor-in-possession financing rolled into exit financing; pre-petition unsecured debt was paid in cash at par; ABS noteholders received recovery through fleet sales and refinancing; the trade-creditor classes were paid in full; pre-petition equity holders received a defined recovery package.

Backstopped rights offering

A capital-raise structure in which existing shareholders are offered the right to subscribe for new shares (typically at a discount to market) in proportion to their current holdings, with one or more sponsors agreeing to purchase any rights that existing shareholders do not exercise. The "backstop" guarantees the issuer's full capital raise regardless of shareholder participation; the structure is favorable to existing shareholders because it gives them first claim on the new equity at preferential terms. The Hertz rights offering at $1.635 billion, backstopped by Knighthead/Certares/Apollo, was the largest equity-recovery vehicle in the plan.

The strategic logic of the structure was that each component served a different stakeholder constituency. The $2.9 billion common equity provided the operating capital. The $1.5 billion Apollo preferred provided downside protection for the sponsor with the most conservative posture. The $1.635 billion rights offering gave existing equity holders the opportunity to participate in the new equity at the same terms as the sponsors. The combination meant the plan could honestly claim to deliver value across every creditor class, retain operational continuity, and provide meaningful equity recovery, a combination that conventional Chapter 11 doctrine treats as nearly impossible.

What pre-petition equity received

Existing Hertz shareholders received: approximately 3% of the reorganized common stock (subject to dilution from warrants and a new management incentive plan); 30-year warrants to purchase 18% of the reorganized common stock at defined strike prices; the right to participate in the $1.635 billion rights offering at the same terms as the sponsors; and cash distributions where shareholders elected. The aggregate value of these components exceeded $1 billion at the plan's confirmation, per Hertz's June 10, 2021 confirmation press release.

In a typical large-cap Chapter 11, pre-petition equity receives zero or token recovery; the equity is treated as out-of-the-money on the day of filing and the company emerges with the senior creditor classes as the new equity holders. Hertz reversed that pattern. The implications for shareholder activism in subsequent distressed situations (Revlon, Bed Bath & Beyond, others) have been visible: retail-investor advocacy in bankruptcy proceedings has become a more organized force partly because Hertz showed that equity recovery is possible.

Judge Walrath's "fantastic result"

Bankruptcy Judge Mary Walrath of the District of Delaware confirmed the plan on June 10, 2021. Her on-record comment to the parties became the most-quoted line of the case.

The comment was unusual on its own merits (bankruptcy judges typically reserve such language) and was instructive about what the court considered the case's distinguishing features. Full creditor recovery was the procedural floor; meaningful equity recovery was the unusual element; the combination of sponsor competition, asset-value recovery, and timing was what made the result possible.

The equity-recovery feature was unusual, and the unusualness deserves explanation. Three macro and structural factors converged in a way that, in any other Chapter 11 of similar scale, would not have aligned.

The used-car price surge

Through 2020-2021 the US used-vehicle market experienced a roughly 53% price increase, driven by new-vehicle supply-chain disruptions (semiconductor shortages limiting new-vehicle production), consumer shifts toward private vehicles during the pandemic, and the broader inflation pressures of the post-stimulus US economy. Hertz's fleet, which through mid-2020 had been seen as a forced-sale liability that would depress the estate's recoveries, became suddenly very valuable. By late 2020 and into 2021, the fleet's wholesale value was rising faster than its book amortization, which improved both the ABS noteholder recoveries and the estate's overall asset value.

The macro effect was real and quantifiable. Hertz's fleet sales through 2020-2021 produced higher realized prices than the bankruptcy filings had originally projected. The Manheim used-vehicle value index hit record highs through 2021. The estate's underlying asset position improved month over month. Without that improvement, the $6 billion competing bids would not have been economically rational; with it, the bids were defensible. The macro tailwind was a necessary condition for the doctrinal outcome.

The fleet that Hertz had been forced to sell at distress prices in April 2020 was, by the spring 2021 auction process, an appreciating asset at record-high wholesale values. Sponsor consortia bidding against that backdrop were pricing a 12-month-improving asset, not a still-deteriorating one.

The mechanics of how the macro tailwind translated into stakeholder recovery deserve attention. Each Hertz ABS facility held a defined vehicle pool whose value was originally booked at expected residual prices. As actual disposal prices rose above those expected residuals through 2020-2021, the ABS noteholders received full recovery on accelerated timelines, the residual equity claim in each ABS pool reverted to the Hertz estate, and the estate's go-forward asset position improved correspondingly. The sponsor consortia bidding for the right to fund the exit were effectively bidding on a moving target whose underlying value was getting better, not worse. The same macro condition would have produced the opposite dynamic in a normal recession.

The travel-demand rebound

Through Q4 2020 and into Q2 2021, US domestic travel demand recovered faster than initial forecasts predicted. Leisure travel returned earlier and more strongly than business travel. Forward bookings for summer 2021 implied that Hertz's go-forward operating model would be supported by demand at levels not too far from pre-pandemic peaks. The sponsor consortia were bidding against a recovering, not a still-collapsing, business.

The Certares consortium's thesis was specifically built on the travel-rebound story. Certares had been raised explicitly to invest in travel and tourism assets, and the firm's leadership argued that the post-COVID travel rebound would be sharper and more durable than the broad consensus had assumed. Their bid for Hertz reflected that thesis directly. The Knighthead and Apollo participation added complementary capital and special-situations execution capability. The consortium's view of the post-emergence opportunity was a necessary input into the bid's economics.

The Hertz Maneuver

The combination of macro tailwind, sponsor competition, and procedural structure became known in legal-academic commentary as the "Hertz Maneuver": the deliberate engineering, by sophisticated parties, of equity recovery in a Chapter 11 case where conventional doctrine suggested wipeout. The University of Chicago Law Review and Stephen Lubben at Seton Hall produced detailed case studies arguing that the maneuver requires: (1) a credible asset-recovery story during the case; (2) sponsor competition for the right to fund the exit; (3) an underlying business franchise that justifies fresh equity investment; (4) timing that aligns the asset-recovery story with the auction process. Without all four conditions, the maneuver is not replicable.

The doctrinal critics argued the Hertz outcome was inappropriate, that the sponsors had effectively captured value that should have flowed to creditors at standard priority. The defenders argued the outcome was a market-clearing result that all creditor classes voted to support and that the bankruptcy court explicitly validated. Both readings are partly correct. The Hertz case has become a teaching reference for modern restructuring doctrine on equity-holder treatment, and our restructuring guide covers the modern Chapter 11 mechanics in more detail.

The 2021 emergence was a model restructuring outcome. The 2022-2024 operational trajectory has been more complicated, and the post-emergence story has its own lessons.

The 2021 relisting and the strategic positioning

Hertz emerged from Chapter 11 on June 30, 2021. The new equity began trading over-the-counter immediately and relisted on NASDAQ on November 9, 2021. Mark Fields (former CEO of Ford) served as interim CEO through early 2022, with Stephen Scherr (former CFO of Goldman Sachs) named permanent CEO in February 2022. The new sponsor group's strategic positioning for the company emphasized growth and fleet differentiation rather than a Mathrani-style operational reset.

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The 100,000-Tesla order

On October 25, 2021, Hertz announced an order for 100,000 Tesla Model 3 vehicles for delivery by end-2022, valued at approximately $4 billion. The announcement triggered a Tesla rally that drove Tesla's market capitalization above $1 trillion for the first time. Hertz simultaneously launched a Tom Brady-led advertising campaign positioning the brand around the EV transition. The order was the largest single electric-vehicle purchase in history at announcement and signaled a deliberate growth-and-narrative move by the new sponsor group.

The strategic logic was defensible. Electric vehicles have lower per-mile operating costs (no fuel, lower maintenance), and Tesla's brand recognition was strong with the leisure-traveler renter base. The execution risks were also real: charging-infrastructure availability at airport locations, parts-and-labor economics for Tesla repairs (which run materially higher than ICE vehicles), and the depreciation profile of a vehicle whose new-vehicle price was being aggressively cut by Tesla itself starting in 2023.

The EV unwinding and Stephen Scherr's exit

Through 2023 and 2024 the Tesla fleet experienced the unfavorable side of every execution risk simultaneously. Tesla's January 2023 and successive new-vehicle price cuts compressed used-Tesla values; per-unit fleet depreciation reached approximately $600 per month, more than triple the comparable ICE-vehicle figure. Repair costs on damaged Teslas ran several multiples of ICE-vehicle costs because Tesla's centralized service-network model meant that even routine collision repairs required Tesla-certified body shops with multi-month backlogs. Renter demand for EVs proved softer than the bull case had assumed, partly because business renters were less familiar with EV charging logistics and partly because airport charging infrastructure at the Hertz return locations was inadequate to support a fleet of this scale.

The unit economics of an EV rental fleet diverged from the ICE-vehicle baseline in ways that even careful underwriting had not fully anticipated. Tesla's brand-driven new-vehicle pricing power, combined with the company's willingness to cut prices aggressively to defend market share, meant that Hertz's purchase price on the original 100,000-vehicle order in late 2021 had become a stale anchor by 2023. The 2024 announcement to liquidate 20,000 EVs implicitly conceded that the fleet had been purchased at prices the market would no longer support, and the resulting depreciation losses flowed directly through the income statement.

Hertz announced in January 2024 it would sell 20,000 of the EVs in its fleet and replace them with internal-combustion vehicles. Q1 2024 EV-related write-downs reached $195 million, and the company posted a Q1 2024 loss of $392 million. Stephen Scherr resigned as CEO in March 2024; Gil West (former Delta COO and former Cruise COO) became CEO. Full-year 2024 losses reached roughly $2.9 billion, the worst year since the emergence. The post-emergence company has been operating against the residual costs of its own ambition.

The case sits at the intersection of two distinct doctrinal areas: Chapter 11 procedure and meme-stock-era securities regulation. The lessons cluster around four themes.

Modern Chapter 11 doctrine

The case established that equity recovery is possible in Chapter 11 when three conditions align: a credible asset-recovery story during the case (which Hertz had via the used-car price surge), sponsor competition for the right to fund the exit (which the CWD vs Knighthead/Certares/Apollo dynamic produced), and an underlying business franchise that justifies fresh equity (which Hertz had via its airport-rental footprint and brand). When those conditions align, the outcome can transcend conventional doctrine. When they do not align, the outcome reverts to the standard equity-wipeout pattern. For candidates approaching distressed-debt and special-situations investing, the broader distressed-debt primer covers how funds position around these opportunities.

Meme-stock-era securities regulation

The June 2020 Hertz equity-offering episode set the modern precedent for SEC intervention in bankruptcy-period equity issuances. Subsequent meme-stock-era bankruptcy debtors (Revlon in 2022, Bed Bath & Beyond in 2023, others) faced similar restrictions. The doctrine that emerged is that a debtor-in-possession's authority to raise capital under court supervision is subject to broader investor-protection considerations that the SEC can enforce in real time. The boundary between bankruptcy-court authority and SEC oversight has been more clearly defined as a result.

The sponsor-competition mechanism

The Hertz auction has become a reference for how sponsor competition in restructurings can deliver value-shifts across stakeholder classes. The bidding-war dynamic, where two competing PE consortia bid against each other for the right to fund the exit, is now a standard playbook feature in larger Chapter 11 cases when an asset-value-recovery story creates the underlying economics. Trade-creditor and equity-recovery outcomes in such cases now reflect the implicit option value of sponsor competition rather than the static priority schedule of the Bankruptcy Code.

The verdict the record supports

Two things are now settled. The May 2020 filing was driven by the ABS structure as much as by the operating cash position; the meme-stock rally was anomalous and the SEC's intervention was the operative regulatory precedent; the bidding war between CWD and Knighthead/Certares/Apollo delivered an equity-recovery outcome that conventional doctrine did not predict; the used-car price spike and travel rebound were necessary macro conditions. What is not settled is whether the post-emergence operational story will validate the sponsor IRR. The Tesla losses, the recurring annual losses through 2024, and the management transitions all suggest that the model restructuring outcome has not translated into commercial outperformance. As of 2026 that question is genuinely open.

For the candidate or analyst working through the case, Hertz is best understood as a near-perfect engineered restructuring outcome that has yet to translate into a sustained operating success. The legal-and-financial structure delivered every conceivable benefit the bankruptcy code allows; the post-emergence company has had to make its own way. The two outcomes are conceptually separable, and the lesson of the case is precisely that distinction. A successful Chapter 11 emergence is necessary, but not sufficient, for a successful post-emergence company.

The wider doctrinal sweep of the case crosses two industry tracks (restructuring and special-situations investing) and one regulatory track (meme-era securities oversight). Candidates approaching restructuring interviews should be able to walk a sharp interviewer through the ABS-trigger mechanics of the May 2020 filing, the SEC's June 2020 intervention rationale, the two-consortium bidding dynamic, and the macro preconditions that made the equity recovery economically possible. Candidates approaching distressed-debt interviews should be able to explain why the post-filing equity rally was a real opportunity for sophisticated investors who understood the asset-recovery thesis, and why doctrinal investors like Icahn who exited at the filing missed the most asymmetric trade in modern Chapter 11 history. The mechanics of how key Chapter 11 documents are drafted and read are covered for candidates in our key deal documents primer, and the broader leveraged finance explainer covers the kinds of debt structures that produce these situations.

1. 1Hertz Global Holdings, Form 8-K announcing the Chapter 11 filing, SEC EDGAR (May 22, 2020).
2. 2Hertz Global Holdings, Press release on Chapter 11 filing (May 22, 2020).
3. 3Motley Fool, "COVID-19 Strikes Again: Hertz Files For Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection" (May 23, 2020).
4. 4Young Money, "The Inefficient Market Hypothesis: How Hertz Became the First Meme Stock".
5. 5University of Chicago Law Review, "The Hertz Maneuver (and the Limits of Bankruptcy Law)".
6. 6Motley Fool, "Hertz Burns Carl Icahn in Bankruptcy" (May 29, 2020).
7. 7Hertz Global Holdings, "Hertz Selects $6 Billion Bid From Knighthead, Certares And Apollo To Fund Chapter 11 Exit" (May 14, 2021).
8. 8Hertz Global Holdings, "Plan Of Reorganization Confirmed By Bankruptcy Court" (June 10, 2021).
9. 9White & Case LLP, "White & Case Leads Hertz to Successful Chapter 11 Exit".
10. 10Skift, "Hertz Bidding War Winner Is Certares and Knighthead in an Auction" (May 12, 2021).
11. 11Washington Post, "Tesla's market value tops $1T after Hertz orders 100K cars" (October 25, 2021).
12. 12TechCrunch, "Hertz is selling 20,000 EVs and replacing them with gas cars" (January 11, 2024).
13. 13Fortune, "Hertz is done gambling with EVs: It took a first-quarter $195 million hit on Teslas" (April 25, 2024).
14. 14Auto Rental News, "How Hertz's Forced Fleet Sale Could Affect the Used Car Market".
15. 15Wolf Street, "Sagging Used-Car Prices, Spiking Maintenance & Repair Costs, and a Post-Bankruptcy Propaganda Coup Turn Toxic for Hertz" (April 29, 2024).