Introduction
A large buyer tells its suppliers that invoices will now be paid in 120 days instead of 60. To soften the news, it introduces them to a bank that will pay them within days, at a discount priced on the buyer's credit rating rather than their own. That arrangement is supply chain finance, also called reverse factoring, and it is one of the quietest ways a company can fund itself.
On the buyer's balance sheet, nothing looks like borrowing. The obligation stays in accounts payable, operating cash flow jumps in the year terms lengthen, and reported leverage can fall. Yet a bank is now financing the buyer's purchases, and if that bank steps back, the cash has to come from somewhere quickly. The gap between presentation and economics is why analysts call it hidden debt.
What follows covers the three-party structure and how it differs from ordinary factoring, the cash conversion math that makes buyers want it, the FASB rule that now puts program balances in the notes, and how analysts adjust net debt, leverage and free cash flow for it. Two collapses, Greensill in 2021 and First Brands in 2025, show what happens when the financing behind working capital disappears.
Supply Chain Finance Versus Factoring at a Glance
Both arrangements turn an unpaid invoice into early cash for the company that sold the goods, which is why the names get mixed up. The difference is who sets up the program and whose credit the funder relies on. In traditional factoring, a supplier sells its own receivables to a factor and pays a price that reflects its customers' credit and its own. In reverse factoring, the buyer sets up the program, and the funder relies on the buyer's promise to pay.
| Feature | Factoring | Reverse factoring (supply chain finance) |
|---|---|---|
| Who sets it up | The seller | The buyer |
| What is financed | Seller's receivables | Buyer's approved payables |
| Credit the funder relies on | Seller's customers, and often the seller | Buyer's credit |
| Who pays the discount | Seller | Supplier, usually |
| Main balance sheet effect | Receivables fall (seller) | Payables stretch (buyer) |
| Analyst concern | Flattered operating cash flow | Debt-like payables |
The two can sit inside the same company: a business can factor what its customers owe it while running a supplier program on what it owes its own vendors. The accounting presentation for both, including when a factoring transfer counts as a true sale, is covered in the accounting guide's article on supplier finance and factoring.
- Factoring
The sale of a company's accounts receivable to a bank or specialist finance company at a discount in exchange for immediate cash. The factor then collects from the customers, and the price reflects their credit quality, how long they take to pay and whether the seller keeps any default risk, known as recourse.
This post concentrates on the buyer-led version, because that is where the debt question bites hardest.
How Reverse Factoring Works
The Three Parties and the Flow of Cash
Every program has three parties: the buyer, usually a large manufacturer or retailer with a strong credit rating; its suppliers, often smaller and more expensive to finance; and a funder, which may be a bank, a group of banks or a platform that places invoices with outside investors. The sequence on a single invoice runs like this:
Supplier invoices
The supplier ships goods and bills the buyer on the agreed terms, say 120 days.
Buyer confirms
The buyer approves the invoice and tells the funder it will pay the full amount on the due date. That confirmation is what the funder is really buying.
Supplier opts in
Through the program's platform, the supplier chooses to sell the confirmed invoice early, one invoice at a time.
Funder pays early
The funder pays the supplier the face value less a discount, often within days.
Buyer pays at maturity
On day 120, the buyer pays the full face value to the funder instead of the supplier.
Notice what the buyer never does: it never borrows. Its obligation is the same invoice for the same amount, typically on the same date; only the payee changes. That is the basis for leaving the balance in accounts payable rather than in debt.
- Reverse Factoring (Supply Chain Finance)
A buyer-led financing program in which a bank or other funder pays the buyer's suppliers early on invoices the buyer has approved, deducting a discount priced on the buyer's credit, and the buyer pays the funder the full invoice amount on the due date. US GAAP calls these arrangements supplier finance programs.
Why the Buyer's Credit Sets the Price
The funder's main risk is that the buyer fails to pay a confirmed invoice, so it prices the discount off the buyer's credit, not the supplier's. That is the credit arbitrage at the heart of the product: a small supplier that would pay a high rate on its own bank line can raise cash at close to the rate of its investment-grade customer.
The Buyer's Payoff: Longer Payables and Released Cash
The Cash Conversion Cycle Example
The buyer's motive is working capital. The cash conversion cycle measures how many days a company's own money is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers:
Take a company that buys $3,650 million of goods a year, or $10 million a day. It collects from customers in 45 days, holds inventory for 75 days and pays suppliers in 60 days. A supplier finance program lets it move to 120-day terms while suppliers who want cash still get it early from the bank.
| Metric | 60-day terms | 120-day terms |
|---|---|---|
| Days sales outstanding | 45 days | 45 days |
| Days inventory outstanding | 75 days | 75 days |
| Days payable outstanding | 60 days | 120 days |
| Cash conversion cycle | 60 days | 0 days |
| Accounts payable | $600M | $1,200M |
The cycle falls from 60 days to zero, and $600 million of cash stays in the company that would otherwise have gone to suppliers. No debt appears, suppliers are paid as fast as before or faster, and the cash flow statement records the jump in payables as an operating inflow.
Why the Release Happens Only Once
The $600 million arrives once, when payables step up from $600 million to $1,200 million. The next year, with purchases flat and terms still at 120 days, the change in working capital adds nothing. Repeating the boost would require stretching terms again or a growing program.
The FASB Disclosure Rule: ASU 2022-04
What Buyers Must Disclose
For years, investors often could not tell whether a rising payables balance came from bargaining power or from a bank program. The FASB responded in September 2022 with ASU 2022-04, which created ASC 405-50 and applies to buyers, not suppliers. As KPMG's summary of the supplier finance standard sets out, a buyer using a program must now disclose:
- The program's key terms, including payment terms and any assets pledged or guarantees given
- The confirmed amount outstanding at the end of each interim and annual period
- Where those obligations are presented on the balance sheet
- An annual roll-forward of invoices confirmed and paid during the year
The core requirements took effect for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2022, so calendar-year companies started in 2023. The roll-forward came a year later, for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2023, and applies prospectively.
- ASU 2022-04
The FASB's 2022 accounting standards update on supplier finance programs, codified in ASC 405-50. It requires buyers that use these programs to disclose key program terms, the confirmed amount outstanding, where it sits on the balance sheet and an annual roll-forward. It changes disclosure only, not how the obligations are recognized, measured or presented.
What the Rule Does Not Change
The standard leaves classification alone: a program balance can stay in accounts payable, with its cash flows in operating activities, unless the terms change the nature of the liability. The number now sits in the footnotes, but reported debt, leverage and free cash flow look exactly as before. Moving it is the analyst's job.
Why Analysts and Rating Agencies Treat It as Debt
The Economic Argument
Compare two companies. One draws $600 million on its revolver to keep paying suppliers on 60-day terms; the other pays on 120-day terms while a bank funds its suppliers. In both cases a bank has advanced $600 million to finance the company's purchases and expects to be repaid by the company. Only the first shows debt. The signs that a program has moved from ordinary trade credit into debt-like territory are visible in the filings, and they belong on any review of accounting red flags and earnings quality:
- Payment terms well beyond industry norms, or beyond the company's own terms before the program
- A confirmed balance that is large or growing fast relative to total payables or to reported debt
- Guarantees, pledged assets or fees paid by the buyer to the funder
- Days payable rising while purchase volumes and margins are flat, and operating cash flow outrunning net income
How Rating Agencies Approach It
Credit analysts flagged the issue years before the disclosure rule. In late 2015, Moody's said the large reverse factoring program at Abengoa, the Spanish engineering group, had debt-like features. In 2018, after the collapse of UK contractor Carillion, Fitch estimated that Carillion's program had let it show roughly £400 million to £500 million owed to financial institutions as "other payables", and said it would treat any extension of payment terms due to reverse factoring as debt in its credit metrics.
The approach rests on disclosure: an agency can only adjust what it can measure, which is why ASU 2022-04 mattered to credit analysts as much as to equity investors. The adjusted debt then flows into the same leverage and coverage ratios lenders use, from debt to EBITDA to cash flow measures.
Adjusting Net Debt, Leverage and Free Cash Flow
Return to the company that stretched its terms. Before the program it had $3,000 million of debt, $500 million of cash and $1,000 million of EBITDA. Assume the program releases $600 million, the company holds that cash, and its underlying free cash flow is paid out as dividends, so only the program moves the balance sheet.
| Metric | Before program | After, as reported | After, adjusted |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debt | $3,000M | $3,000M | $3,600M |
| Cash | $500M | $1,100M | $1,100M |
| Net debt | $2,500M | $1,900M | $2,500M |
| Net debt / EBITDA | 2.5x | 1.9x | 2.5x |
As reported, the company appears to have deleveraged by 0.6x of EBITDA. Adjusted, nothing has changed: cash went up because a bank is funding more of the purchases. Analysts differ on how much to add. Adding only the extension above normal terms ($600 million here) follows the logic Fitch described; adding the full confirmed balance ($1,200 million, taking net debt to $3,100 million and leverage to 3.1x) is the conservative choice. Either way, it belongs among the judgment items in a net debt bridge, alongside leases and pensions.
Free cash flow needs the matching fix. If underlying free cash flow is $400 million, the year of the extension reports $1,000 million, a jump from 40% to 100% of EBITDA. The analyst strips out the growth in the program balance, which the roll-forward now discloses, and judges free cash flow quality on the $400 million.
Supply chain finance tests net debt and cash flow quality in one question: Practice enterprise value, working capital and credit questions with worked answers, start practicing interview questions for free and catch the adjustments interviewers expect before they ask for them.
Greensill: When the Funder Disappears
How the Model Stretched
Greensill Capital, founded by Lex Greensill, presented itself as a supply chain finance provider. It advanced money against claims on companies' customers and packaged those claims into notes sold to investors, most prominently through four Credit Suisse funds, the first launched with Greensill in 2017. Clients had about $10 billion invested in those funds when Credit Suisse closed them in March 2021.
Switzerland's regulator later set out how far the product had drifted. In FINMA's findings on the Greensill funds, it said Greensill, not Credit Suisse, selected and reviewed the claims, that it increasingly transferred future claims that did not yet exist, financing some companies of doubtful creditworthiness, and that Credit Suisse relied on insurance Greensill arranged in its own name. A claim on a sale that has not happened is not an invoice; it is closer to an unsecured loan wearing a trade finance label.
The Collapse in March 2021
The chain broke when Greensill lost insurance coverage for its notes. Credit Suisse froze the funds in early March 2021, and Greensill Capital filed for insolvency in the UK on March 8, 2021, saying in its court filing that its largest client, Sanjeev Gupta's GFG Alliance, had started to default. In February 2023, FINMA concluded that Credit Suisse had seriously breached its supervisory obligations in the relationship.
First Brands: When the Receivables Were Not There
The Off-Balance-Sheet Stack
First Brands Group, an Ohio-based auto parts maker behind brands such as FRAM and Raybestos, filed for Chapter 11 on September 28, 2025, in the Southern District of Texas, listing liabilities in the $10 billion to $50 billion range. As a private company, it published no SEC filings, and much of its funding sat outside reported debt in working capital financing on both sides of the balance sheet:
- Factoring: it sold invoices owed by retailers to funds such as Jefferies' Point Bonita, which disclosed about $715 million of exposure to invoices owed by customers including Walmart and AutoZone, and said First Brands had stopped forwarding their payments on September 15.
- Supplier finance: its initial list of largest unsecured creditors, as reported by Global Trade Review, showed supply chain finance claims of about $866 million across 12 creditors.
- Inventory financing: further off-balance-sheet facilities were secured on inventory.
What Creditors Found
In October 2025, Raistone, a financing partner that depended on First Brands for more than 80% of its revenue, asked the court to appoint an examiner, telling the court that as much as $2.3 billion may have "simply vanished", according to Bloomberg's report on Raistone's motion. In January 2026, federal prosecutors in Manhattan unsealed an indictment of founder Patrick James and his brother Edward James on bank fraud, wire fraud and money-laundering conspiracy charges, alleging double- and triple-pledged collateral, fabricated invoices and concealed liabilities. These are allegations, and Patrick James has denied them.
For a credit analyst, the case reverses the usual worry. Reverse factoring's risk is a real obligation hidden in payables; factoring's risk, at its worst, is a receivable that does not exist or has been sold twice. The DIP financing, asset sales and creditor fights that followed are covered in the restructuring guide's review of 2025's notable cases.
Answering the Interview Question
A common version is: "A company uses supply chain finance to extend payables from 60 to 120 days. What happens to the statements and to net debt?" Interviewers are testing whether you can separate reported numbers from the economics, and whether you see the liquidity risk behind a better-looking balance sheet.
Reverse factoring builds on the three statements and the EV bridge: The 160-page PDF covers accounting, the links between the three statements, enterprise value and LBO analysis, and have the foundations in place before a working capital question turns technical.
Key Takeaways
- Reverse factoring lets a funder pay suppliers early on invoices the buyer has confirmed, priced on the buyer's credit.
- Buyers use it to stretch days payable and release cash, a benefit that arrives once.
- ASU 2022-04 requires buyers to disclose program terms, confirmed balances and an annual roll-forward, without changing classification.
- Analysts and rating agencies often add program balances to net debt and remove their growth from free cash flow.
- Greensill showed funding risk; First Brands showed collateral and fraud risk in off-balance-sheet working capital finance.
Conclusion
Supply chain finance is not a scandal by design. Used at modest scale, it gives suppliers cheaper funding and buyers steadier payment cycles, and plenty of strong companies run programs for exactly that reason. The trouble starts when the program becomes a funding source the buyer cannot do without, sitting in accounts payable while doing the work of a credit facility.
The analyst's task is to put the number where the economics say it belongs, in net debt and out of free cash flow. Greensill and First Brands are extreme cases, but both turned on what happens to working capital when the money behind it leaves.
For a candidate, the topic rewards connected thinking: a payables question becomes a leverage question, then a cash flow quality question, then a liquidity question, and the strongest answers cover all four.






